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WILLS AND TRUSTS
I. CONSTRUCTION OF A STATUTE
The court did not cover any new ground in the construc-
tion of statutes during the survey period. On the contrary, it
made clear in Scarborough v. Hodge1 its intention to adhere
to a particular construction which was laid down in 1853.
Cecil Hodge died testate in 1968 but since his sole bene-
ficiary predeceased him, his estate was to pass as intestate
property under South Carolina's laws of descent and distribu-
tion. Hodge was survived by no mother, father, widow or
siblings of the whole blood, but only by one sister of the half
blood and one niece and three nephews, the four children of
a predeceased brother of the whole blood.
The niece and nephews contended that the five heirs
should inherit in equal shares, or one-fifth each, but the half-
sister claimed that she inherited a one-half interest and the
niece and nephews inherited a one-half interest collectively,
or one-eighth for each of them. The lower court and this court
agreed with the half-sister. The applicable statute2 reads in
part:
(4) If the intestate shall leave no child or other lineal descendant,
father, mother, brother or sister of the whole blood, but shall leave a
widow and brother or sister of the half blood and a child or children
of a brother or sister of the whole blood, the widow shall take one
moiety of the estate and the other moiety shall be equally divided be-
tweeit the brothers and sisters of the half blood, and the children of
the brothers and sisters of the whole blood, the children of every
deceased brother and sister of the whole blood taking among them a
share equal to the share of a brother or sister of the half blood .
(7) If the intestate shall leave no widow the provisions made for her
shall go as the rest of the estate is directed to be distributed in the
respective clauses in which the widow is provided for.
The court admitted that although the argument of the
-niece and nephews was a forceful one, it would adhere to the
interpretation of Section 19-52 as set forth in Felder v. Felder
3
1. 187 S.E.2d 793 (S.C. 1972).
2. S.C. CODE A,-N. §19-52 (1962) (emphasis added).
3. 5 Rich. Eq. 509. This case interpreted Act No. 1489, V.S.C. STAT. AT
LARGE 162, 1791 which was the predecessor of our present statute.
678
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in 1853. In that case the facts were almost identical except
that there were more parties, i.e., three half-brothers and nine
children of a deceased brother of the whole blood. The court
there said simply that the legislature had expressly given to
the nine the share that their parent would have taken and
that it was not their province to question the wisdom of the
legislature.
That court reasoned as follows: The phrase "the children
of every deceased brother and sister of the whole blood taking
among them as a share equal to the share of a brother or
sister of the half blood," means clearly that each half brother
or sister should take a share as large as the share to be dis-
tributed among the children, however numerous, of a de-
ceased brother or sister of the whole blood.
While the share of a half brother or sister was not pre-
cisely defined, equality of shares was necessarily implied in
every direction for division unless inequality was expressly
prescribed. Therefore, the half brothers and/or sisters would
take shares equal to those of each other, and the children of
predeceased whole brothers and/or sisters would take a share
among them equal to one of these shares. That court reasoned
that the preceding phrase which read "shall be equally divided
between the brothers and sisters of the half blood and the
children of brothers and sisters of the whole blood" was not
inconsistent with the phrase that followed. "Equally divided"
did not necessarily import division into equal shares, and from
its collocation there must have meant rather to divide upon
terms of equality and equity, as evidenced by the language
of the preamble to the act. The term "equally divided" means
no more than divided upon terms of equal justice to the
parties.
In that early case, the children argued that the general
purpose of the act was to postpone the half blood to the whole
blood and that such a literal interpretation of the words vio-
lated this purpose. In other cases it had been argued that,
quite to the contrary, the main principle of the act was to call
the kindred of the intestate to the succession according to
propinquity and not quantity of blood. But the court simply
rejected the children's argument saying that there was no
evidence of such a purpose to postpone except in the instances
enumerated in the act, and that as for principles, there was
no uniform principle which could be said to pervade the act.
1972]
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Concluding, that court stated that the right of kindred
to inheritance and succession in estates is not a natural right,
but entirely of civil institution. Therefore, the legislature could
regulate the area in any way it saw fit and the province of
the court was to expound these regulations and not to deflect
or overrule them on conceits of symmetry and policy.
In accepting this early construction of the statute, the
court stated that the public interest was best served when the
law remained permanently settled,4 especially when property
had vested over the years based on a particular construction.
II. CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATON OF A WILL:
INTENTION OF TESTATOR
A. Effect of Superadded Words
There were three cases during the survey period which
involved the construction of wills, and much of the same au-
thority was relied on in the determination of each.
Federal Land Bank of Columbia v. Wood5 involved the
construction of a will in order to ascertain the interest there-
under of certain remaindermen.
The will provided:
ITEM II. I will and devise all the real estate of which I may die
seized and possessed unto my beloved wife, Ida Walker Wood, to be
hers for and during the term of her natural life; and upon the death
of my said wife I will and devise said real estate unto my two chil-
dren, Charles Kenneth Wood and Jewell Wood Hall, share and share
alike, PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that if either of my said two chil-
dren should predecease my said wife, without leaving a child or chil-
dren, of which such child is the natural parent then and in such event,
I will and direct that the share of my said real estate which would have
gone to such predeceased child shall go directly to my surviving child,
absolutely and in fee; PROVIDED, FURTHER, HOWEVER, that
if either of my said children should predecease my wife leaving a child
or children of which such child was the natural parent, then and in such
event, the share that such child or children would have taken, had such
child or children survived my wife, shall go in fee to such natural child
or children of either of my children who might predecease my wife.
It is my specific intention by the devise of my real estate, as herein-
above set forth and the language used, to express such devise to spe-
4. 187 S.E2d at 794, quoting from Alexander v. Honeycutt, 196 S.C. 364,
13 S.E.2d 630 (1941).
5. 334 F. Supp. 1124 (D.S.C. 1971).
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cifically and absolutely eliminate any adopted child or adopted children
or step-child or step-children of either of my children from taking any
interest in my said real estate, in the event of the happening of the con-
tingencies hereinabove set forth.6
In addition to two other liens which existed on the prop-
erty, the wife and the two named children had given the FRA
a mortgage on it and in this foreclosure action it was neces-
sary to determine the interest the children held in remainder
in order to apply the same to the debt. Mrs. Wood clearly had
a life estate.
The two children contended that the remainder had
vested in them in fee, and that the later clauses (following
"PROVIDED, HOWEVER") did not cut it down since they
were of doubtful import and intended only to insure that any
adopted and step-grandchildren would take nothing.
The court disagreed. It held that the state of the title
was a life estate in Ida Walker Wood and a vested7 remainder
subject to divestment in Charles Kenneth Wood and Jewell
Wood Hall with executory interests in the unborn children as
well as Charles Kenneth Wood and Jewell Wood Hall.
The court pointed out that in construing the provisions
of a will every effort must be made to determine and carry
out the Testator's intentions and that while primary resort
must be had to the language used in the instrument 9 if the
language was vague or ambiguous the circumstances sur-
rounding its execution could be considered in determining this
intention.10 It noted that at the time of the will's execution
the testator's daughter was married to a man with three chil-
dren whom she was considering adopting, and that the tes-
tator appeared to dislike the father as well as the children.
While the testator undoubtedly intended to exclude these
children, the court reasoned, the language also expressed an
6. Id. at 1126.
7. The court used the test laid down in Faber v. Police, 10 S.C. 376 (1877),
to determine whether the remainder was vested subject to divestment or con-
tingent.
8. 334 F. Supp. at 1127, citing Citizens and Southern Nat'l. Bank of S. C.
v. Cleveland, 200 S.C. 373, 20 S.E.2d 811 (1942).
9. Id., citing Shelly v. Shelly, 244 S.C. 598, 137 S.E.2d 851 (1964) ; White
v. White, 241 S.C. 181, 127 S.E.2d 627 (1962).
10. Id., citing Citizens and Southern Nat'l. Bank of S. C. v. Cleveland,
4uJ'ra.
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undeniable intention to keep the property within the blood
lines of the family. This intention
[C]ould be mostly easily defeated by a ruling vesting the property in
the life tenant with the declaration that the son and daughter are in-
vested with a remainder in fee. (If that were the case) nothing would
prevent the three of them from conveying, or devising to whom they
pleased, nor an adopted child of either from inheriting.1 1
The court concluded that the will did not vest an inde-
feasible remainder in Charles Kenneth Wood and Jewell Wood
Hall, and that they could not convey by mortgage any more
than they had. Therefore, after the foreclosure sale of the
property, only their proportionate share of the proceeds would
be applied to their debt.
In Johnson v. Waldrop,'2 the dispute was over whether
or not certain added words in a will could qualify or limit an
estate granted in an earlier clause. The will read as follows:
This is my last will. I give, bequeath and devise to my wife, Leona J.
Waldrop, in complete perfect ownership, all my rights and property of
every nature, whether real, personal or mixed, wherever situated, ap-
pointing her executrix without bond. Upon the death of my wife, it is
to be divided equally between my sister, Mrs. Mamie Waldrop Waldrep
and my brother, Ernest L. Waldrop.' 3
The court held that there the second clause did limit the
estate granted in the first clause and that therefore testator's
wife, Leona J. Waldrop, took a life estate coupled with the
power to dispose and consume rather than a fee simple inter-
est, as the appellants contended. It reasoned that this was
clearly the intention of testator and therefore, according to
the law,14 that was what should be given effect.
The court said that the test such superadded words must
meet in order to be given effect was laid down in Walker v.
Alverson :'r
11. 334 F. Supp. at 1130.
12. 256 S.C. 372, 182 S.E.2d 730 (1971).
13. Id. at 374, 182 S.E.2d at 730.
14. Id. at 375, 182 S.E.2d at 731, citing Rogers v. Rogers, 221 S.C. 360,
70 S.E.2d 637 (1952); Peoples Nat'l. Bank of Greenville v. Harrison, 198
S.C. 457, 18 S.E.2d 1 (1941).
15. 87 S.C. 55, 68 S.E. 966 (1910).
To have . . . effect, the subsequent words should be at least as clear
in expressing (their) intention as the words in which the interest is
given. 10
16. Id. at 968.
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Since the intent in the second clause to limit the devise
given in the first was manifested clearly and unmistakably
it was given effect.1'7
B. Implied Revocation By Codicil
A similar problem was presented to the United States
District Court in Starratt v. Morsels and the court relied
partly on Johnson v. Waldrop, supra, for the solution.
This action involved two sections of a will which dis-
posed of the testator's residuary estate in "clear, precise and
unambiguous language" to her husband and son, and a sub-
sequent codicil, executed after the testator had gone blind,
which stated, inter alia:
FOUR: I direct that my granddaughter, Elizabeth Fenn Morse, shall
be my sole residuary legatee. 1 9
The plaintiff's granddaughter contended that this para-
graph of the codicil was so wholely inconsistent with the lan-
guage in the above mentioned sections of the will as to legally
revoke and vitiate these sections in their entirety by necessary
implication. The district court disagreed and presented a
thorough discussion of authority to the contrary.
It noted that generally, under South Carolina law, revo-
cations by implication of provisions of a will are not favored.
Only where the provisions in question are absolutely irrecon-
cilable will the latter prevail over the former, and even in
17. Plaintiff-respondent relied on Schroder v. Antipas, 215 S.C. 552, 56
S.E.2d 354 (1949), in which the court had disregarded the second clause, say-
ing it was inconsistent, unclear, meaningless and of doubtful import. In the
present case the court said that, very simply, the language met the criteria
while it failed to do so in Schroder. The will there read as follows (original
spelling and punctuation preserved) :
I give devise and bequeath my entire estate real and per-
sonal mixed and of every kind and dissciption whatsoever
which I may own or be in any wise entitled to at the time of
my death unto my wife Emma R. Schroder her heirs executors
adminestrators and assignis for ever. I hereby announce con-
stutute and appoint my Said wife Emma R. Schroder Sole
executrix of this my last will and testament. During her life time
and after her death said estate is to be given to the United Synod
of the Southern Evangelical Lutheran Church for aiding worthy
Yong men for the Gospel Ministry in said Synod.
18. 332 F. Supp. 1038 (D.S.C. 1972).
19. Id. at 1042.
1972]
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those cases the first provision will not be disturbed any more
than is absolutely necessary to give effect to the second.
20
The court said that its duty here was to construe the will
and codicils as a single and entire instrument, as if they had
been executed simultaneously, and to harmonize and give
meaning to all parts thereof, not allowing a codicil to vary
the will unless such was the plain intent of the testator.21
In holding that paragraph 4 of the codicil did not revoke
the sections of the will in question, the court said:
The Court finds nothing, either outside of the Will and its Codicils or
within the four corners thereof, evincing any special motive, purpose,
or intent on the part of the testatrix to effect such a revocation-that
is, to have her granddaughter take her entire residuary estate to the
exclusion of her husband and only son. If the testatrix had in fact
intended such a change, it is reasonable to assume that she would have
so indicated, for in every instance in the Codicils where she 'revoked,'
'deleted,' 'eliminated,' or otherwise 'changed' any gift, legacy, bequest
or provision of her Will she made direct reference to the paragraph,
section, subsection, or even line or word of her Will which she wanted
to alter.
22
The court concluded that:
It is true (under Section 19-221, Code of Laws of South Carolina,
1962), that, if there is an irreconcilable conflict between the Will and
a Codicil the latter must prevail, but the Court finds no irreconcilable
conflict between the Will and the Codicils in this case. It is reasonable
to infer from all the circumstances . . . that the testatrix (apparently
thinking that she may have overlooked particular items in her blindness
and wanting her granddaughter to have them) intended the language
in paragraph 4 of the first Codicil to create a residuary beneficiary
to receive any personal property not specifically bequeathed.
23
III. ADMINSTRATION OF A WILL
A. Claims Against the Estate: Attorneys' Fees and Admin-
istrators' Commissions
In Minter v. State of South Carolina Dept. of Mental
Health,24 the court dealt with the question of the validity of
claims against an estate and the priority of their payment.
20. Id. at 1044-45, citing Werber v. Moses, 117 S.C. 157, 108 S.E2d 396
(1920) (and the cases cited therein).
21. 332 F. Supp. at 1045.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 258 S.C. 186, 187 S.E.2d 890 (1972).
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Respondent was his mother's sole heir and administrator
of her estate. She had died after spending over 30 years in
the State Hospital due to her mental illness. The hospital filed
a claim for $15,796.81 against the estate for her care and
maintenance over these years. In his first and final accounting
the respondent, as administrator, proposed disbursements to
himself of $546.05 as "commissions on all funds," $500.00 as
"fee for origination funds in the estate," as well as $276.00
to his attorney for services rendered in connection with the
administration.
The respondent contended that the hospital had con-
tracted with his father, during the life of Mrs. Minter, to
accept payment of $7.00 per month as full and complete pay-
ment of her past, present and future expenses while in the
hospital, and that therefore its claim was erroneous.
The first question for the court was whether the State
Hospital could and did validly make such a contract when the
established charges for such care and maintenance were $60.00
per month.
The court found that the South Carolina Mental Health
Association had the authority to establish the charges for the
care of patients in the mental health facilities of the State at
$60.00 per month ;25 that the estate of a deceased patient was
liable for such State care ;26 that a general lien existed upon
the real and personal property of any person who had received
such care to the extent of the total expense to the State in
providing the care ;27 and that the Commission could contract
with persons financially unable to pay the established rate for
a lesser amount to be paid,28 but that such contract could
pertain only to the patient's present and future needs and
could not reduce any obligation already accumulated. It
pointed out that there was no evidence to support respondent's
contention that the alleged contract had any reference to the
amount already due.
The court reasoned that the question of a contract for the
future services need not be settled because there was not even
25. S.C. CODE ANN. §32-1026 (1962).
26. S.C. CODE ANN. §32-1027 (1962).
27. S.C. CODE ANXN. §32-1029 (1962).
28. S.C. CODE ANx. §32-1028 (1962).
1972]
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enough money in the decedent's estate to pay for the past
services.
The court concluded that the hospital had a valid claim
against the estate in the amount of $7,452.75,29 that such was
a debt due the public3 ° within the purview of Section 19-
476 (2) of the Code, and that the hospital was entitled to pay-
ment of such sum in preference to the payment of $500.00 to
the respondent for "originating funds" on his mother's behalf
during her lifetime.
The second question concerned the administrator's com-
mission. Following Mr. Minter's death, Mrs. Minter was en-
titled to certain benefits from the Veterans Administration.
Pursuant to Section 32-1042 of the Code, these were paid over
to the State Hospital as her custodian. When Mrs. Minter
died, the hospital paid her funeral expenses of $1,198.29 from
these funds and paid over the balance to the respondent. The
respondent claimed a commission as administrator on the
amount paid by the hospital for the funeral as well as the
balance.
The court held that pursuant to Section 19-534 of the
Code which controls such matters as well as the authority of
In Re Outz's Estate,3' the respondent had no valid basis for
the allowance of an administrator's commission on the amount
paid by the hospital because he never actually received and
paid out the funds for the funeral expenses. He was entitled
only to commissions on the balance paid over to him.
The final question was whether the attorney's fees of the
respondent should be paid out of the assets of the estate. In
his first and final return as administrator the respondent
29. The amount due up to the date of the alleged contract in 1956 was
$10,198.75. A charge of $7.00 per month for the period after the alleged con-
tract would amount to $924.00, a total of $11,122.75. Respondent paid the hos-
pital $3,600 in Social Security benefits and Mr. Winter paid $70.00, a total of
$3,670.00. Thus, the balance due was $7,452.75.
30. "Debts due to the public" represent all debts of any kind to the state
or other governmental body. Baxter v. Baxter, 23 S.C. 114 (1884).
31. 245 S.C. 150, 139 S.E.2d 465, 467 (1964), where the court stated:
[Wihether the assets of an estate be money, or other personal
property, before an executor or administrator is entitled to
commissions, he must actually receive the money or other per-
sonal property, and pay away the money or distribute the
personal assets in kind.
[Vol. 24
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proposed to pay his attorney $276.00 for his services. The
appellants accepted this amount, but objected to the payment
of $500.00 as recommended by the Master and that of $750.00
as ordered by the trial judge.
The appellants contended that the difference between
the amount to which they were entitled and the amount the
respondent proposed to pay them lay in respondent's invalid
claims against the estate. Therefore, they maintained, the
respondent was litigating solely for his own benefit under
the guise of administrator and consequently could not charge
the estate with the attorney's fees thus incurred.
The court agreed. The $500.00 claimed as an originating
fee was a simple debt of the estate and could not take priority
over the public debt to the appellants. The commission claimed
was $319.99 too high. This total of $819.99 was the exact dif-
ference between the sum offered by respondent and the
amount claimed by appellants. The respondent was the only
person who stood to gain from his victory.
In light of this, the court concluded that the litigation
was solely for respondent's own benefit and consequently the
estate should not have to pay the expense. The attorney's fee
in excess of the original $276.00 should be collected from
Mr. Minter individually and not the estate.
32
B. Conveyances by Executors and Assertion of Title
There were two cases during the survey period which
resulted in part from the acts or omissions of the executors.
In one, Judson v. Solomons, 33 the court affirmed the judgment
of the lower court and adopted its opinion, declaring the ex-
ecutors' act valid.
32. The court referred to the cases of Ex Parte Landrum, 69 S.C. 136,
48 S.E. 47 (1903), and McClellan v. Hetherington, 10 Rich. Eq. 202 (1856).
The principle to be deduced therefrom seems to be that an administrator or ex-
ecutor should be reimbursed from the estate for any expense he incurs, including
attorney's fees, in litigation fairly falling upon him in his character as trustee.
This applies even though he may have some interest in the suit, but in all cases
the several devises and legacies should be charged only with a ratable proportion
of the fee according to their values. Conversely, it seems that if the administrator
or executor is the only one to benefit from the litigation then its burden should
not fall on any other parties who have interests in the estate. And if the other
parties' interests consume the estate, the burden rests with the administrator
or executor individually.
33. 257 S.C. 343, 185 S.E2d 821 (1971).
1972]
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In 1964 Mr. William E. Solomons leased a tract of land
to his nephew, S. B. Solomons, for the years 1966 through
1970 with an option to buy the tract from his estate within
one year after his death.
In 1965, Mr. Solomons executed his Last Will and Testa-
ment wherein he exhaustedly and in great detail disposed of
all his real and personal property except for the tract in ques-
tion to which he did not refer at all. The residue of his estate
was to go to his 29 nieces and nephews.
The testator died in 1967 and within one year after his
death S. B. Solomons paid the stipulated purchase price to his
executors and they conveyed the tract to him. Five of the
twenty-nine beneficiaries under the residuary clause of the
will brought this action to declare the deed null and void. The
rest executed disclaimers in favor of S. B. Solomons.
The first question here concerned the validity of the op-
tion. The lower court reasoned that the instrument was not
void as being a testamentary directive. The lease instrument
had created an immediate right in S. B. Solomons to exercise
the option. Therefore, it was only the enjoyment (exercise)
of the option which was postponed, not its creation. 34
Furthermore, in Lindler v. Adcock,35 the rule was stated
that the
[P]urchaser had a valid option to purchase lands of the grantor upon
his death even though the instrument creating the option made no pro-
vision whatever as to whom the purchase price would be paid or who
would execute the deed.
30
But the court said that it was not necessary to invoke that
rule in this case because the instrument provided that the tract
would be purchased "from the estate" and this intention could
be given effect.
The second question involved the validity of the tender
of payment to the executors. The plaintiffs contended that the
legal title to the land passed to the 29 residuary beneficiaries
upon the testator's death and that therefore the tender should
34. Id. at 349, 185 S.E.2d at 824, citing Hydrick v. Hydrick, 142 S.C. 531,
551, 144 S.E 156 (1927).
35. 250 S.C. 383, 158 S.E.2d 192 (1967).
36. 257 S.C. at 349, 185 S.E.2d at 824.
[Vol. 24
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have been made to them, not the executor. The lower court
disagreed, saying that since the instrument containing the
options specifically provided37 that the purchase should be
from the "estate of the owner," and since the term "estate of"
is neither synonymous or equivalent to the "heirs"38 the word
"estate" should be construed in a sense that would accomplish
the purpose of the instrument.3 9
Reviewing several pieces of evidence, the lower court
said:
[I]t is obvious that the grantor of this option .. . intended that the
purchase price be paid to the executors under his Will as personal
representatives of 'the Estate of the Owner,' rather than requiring the
purchaser to make tender to each of the twenty-nine nieces and
nephews referred to in the residuary clause.4 0
Concluding that the tender was valid and sufficient, the
lower court reasoned that it would be inequitable to require
more of S. B. Solomons in exercising the option than the
grantor intended or than was reasonable under the circum-
stances.
41
Wannamaker v. Wannamaker42 was an action seeking a
partition of lands and an accounting for waste. W. W. Wanna-
maker died testate in 1922. His will provided that the rest and
residue of his real estate should go to his children and upon
their respective deaths to their lineal descendants. The rest
and residue of his personal property of every kind and nature
was given to the Home Bank of St. Matthews as trustee to
invest, paying the proceeds to his children or their lineal
descendants.
37. The principle the court relied on was stated in Richardson v. Cooler,
115 S.C. 102, 107, 104 S.E. 305 (1920):
[I]n the absence of any provision in the deed to the contrary,
the renewal money belongs to him who has the title to the land
at the time it accrues and from whose ownership the interest is
then created. But here the deeds do contain provisions to the
contrary, for they expressly provide that the renewal money
shall be paid to respective grantors, ....
38. 257 S.C. at 351, 185 S.E2d at 825, citing Carter v. Wroten, 187 S.C.
432, 198 S.E. 13 (1937).
39. Id., citing Cannon v. Ballenger, 222 S.C. 39, 71 S.E.2d 513 (1952).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 352, 185 S.E.2d at 825, citing In Re Hayes Estate, 84 N. Y.
Supp. 2d 593 (1948).
42. 258 S.C. 167, 187 S.E2d 657 (1972).
1972]
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The personal properties of the testator included two bonds
and mortgages covering two tracts of land. The executors of
the estate foreclosed on these mortgages although cash was
readily available to pay the debts of the estate. The attorney
for the executors was the successful bidder at the referee's
sale, but no deeds were executed and delivered. The two tracts
were subsequently sold in 1931 for taxes in the name of
"W. W. Wannamaker Estate" and at the time of trial one
rested with Banker's Trust, as trustee, the other with A. S.
Smoke, both tracts having changed hands several times.
The plaintiffs here, one remaining son and the grand-
children of W. W. Wannamaker, claimed title to the land as
"beneficiaries and devisees under the Last Will and Testament
of W. W. Wannamaker, deceased."
The trial judge refused the various motions of both sides
but granted a new trial because of the erroneous charges of
law to the jury. The plaintiffs and defendants appealed.
The defendants said their motion for nonsuit and directed
verdict should have been granted because the plaintiffs had
simply failed to prove title to the land in themselves. By bring-
ing the action asserting title and calling for partition the
plaintiffs had assumed this burden.
The supreme court agreed and remanded the case to the
lower court for entry of judgment for the defendants. It rea-
soned that no title had vested in plaintiff pursuant to the
section of the will regarding real estate because the testator
simply did not own the land at his death; he had no title.
Without question, it continued, the bonds and mortgages were
personalty. Had the trustee procured a deed from the referee
after the foreclosure sale, as he was entitled to do, he would
have held the lands in lieu of the bonds and mortgages and
administered them as part of the trust estate. But he did not
do so.
Furthermore, the executors' actions of returning the land
for back taxes did not vest title in anyone. They were acting
merely as fiduciaries of the trustee. The failure of the execu-
tors, their attorney or the trustee to do what they should have
done did not vest the title in the plaintiffs.
[Vol. 24
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The court stated:
We know of no theory under which it can be said that title to the real
estate involved in this case came to be vested in the plaintiffs, indi-
vidually, or as distributees or legatees of the probate estate, or as bene-
ficiaries of the trust estate. The trustee was entitled to a deed. The
children and grandchildren of W. W. Wannamaker never had title
to the land such as to entitle them partition.
43
The court did not consider the responsibilities or liabili-
ties of the executors or the trustee.
IV. ADMINISTRATION OF A TRUST
A. Sale of Property to a Life Beneficiary
Flowers v. Oakdale Realty and Water Corporation44 was
an action in trespass to try title instituted by the remainder-
men against the remote grantees of the life beneficiary of a
trust who had purchased the trust property at foreclosure
sale and subsequently conveyed it.
S. W. Gee died testate in 1925 and established the trust in
his will, devising the property in question to A. B. Flowers:
To have and to hold in trust nevertheless for the sole use, benefit and
behoof of my cousin Mrs. Theo Young Flowers, for and during the
term of her natural life; and said A. B. Flowers shall have the control
and management of said place for and during the term of the life of
Mrs. Theo Young Flowers with the specific understanding that the said
Mrs. Theo Young Flowers shall have the right to possess the said
premises at all times and receive the net benefits and proceeds arising
and accruing therefrom.4 5
After the death of the cestui que trustent, the will pro-
vided that the property should vest immediately in the legiti-
mate children of the cestui que trustent, who are the plaintiffs
here.
Prior to his death, the testator had pledged the property
in question as security for a loan to pay off a note. When the
note was not paid the mortgage was foreclosed and the prop-
erty was sold at public auction in 1930, Mrs. Flowers being
the purchaser. She disposed of it in 1936, and at the date of
trial title rested in several remote grantees.
43. Id. at 661.
44. 256 S.C. 591, 183 S.E.2d 513 (1971).
45. Id. at 596, 183 S.E.2d at 514.
1972]
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As the court pointed out, the key to this case was the fact
that Mrs. Flowers was not a life tenant at all, but rather the
beneficiary of a testamentary trust. A. B. Flowers held an
active trust, for he was to farm and manage the property.
The plaintiffs had a remainder interest in the property after
the death of Mrs. Flowers, but she held no fiduciary relation..
ship to them whatsoever. As the beneficiary (for her life) of
the trust
[Sihe had no responsibility to the remaindermen with the possible
exception of waste and, therefore, when she purchased the property
at the foreclosure sale, having no fiduciary relationship to the remain-
dermen under the will it was a good and valid purchase as no fraud
or conspiracy is alleged.
46
The court pointed out that every case and each authority
used by the plaintiffs dealt with the purchase of property by a
life tenant and holder of legal title, and in such cases the life
tenant justifiably is not allowed to require title adverse to
the remaindermen because he is under a duty to preserve the
property for them.
But here Mrs. Flowers did not own the life estate. Legal
title to the life estate was held by A. B. Flowers, the trustee,
and it was he who owed the remaindermen the duty to pre-
serve their estate. The court stated:
Since Mrs. Flowers was a mere beneficiary of the Gee trust and had
no fiduciary duties under it, she had no duty to perform that which
was inconsistent with the character of purchase at a judicially ordered
and approved sale.4 7
Anderson v. Butler48 was cited by the court as containing
an applicable principle. In that case the facts were very sim-
ilar, except that one of the remaindermen had been named
executor and trustee, and it was he who bought the property.
The court said that the case was "authority for the proposi-
tion that in South Carolina such a purchase at a judicial sale,
lacking some chilling of the bid, fraud or conspiracy is not
invalid.
49
As there was no fraud, collusion, chilling of or insuffi-
cient bid alleged here, the court agreed, per curiam, with the
46. Id. at 597, 183 S.E.2d at 515.
47. Id. at 599, 183 S.E.2d at 516.
48. 31 S.C. 183, 9 S.E. 797 (1889).
49. 256 S.C. at 601, 183 S.E2d at 517.
[Vol. 24
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circuit court that Mrs. Flowers had acquired valid title to the
property through the foreclosure sale, to the exclusion of
plaintiffs' interest in remainder.
B. Duties and Liabilities of Trustees
Alderman v. Cooper"° involved the liability of several
trustees for wrongfully delivering trust, property to one other
than the rightful owner.
The plaintiff, Margaret Alderman, was a remainderman
in the will of Mr. John Hughes Cooper, which was admitted
to probate in 1945. The defendants were trustees thereunder.
Testimony showed that in 1955 and 1959 the plaintiff assigned
all of her interests in the Cooper estate to Mr. Charles F.
Cooper as security for advances made and to be made to
her totaling $35,000.00. In fact the advances totaled over
$67,000.00. It was agreed that if the advances were not repaid
by 1965 the assignments would become absolute. Within 30
months of the 1959 assignment, the trustees turned over to
Mr. Cooper trust funds belonging to the plaintiff valued at
more than $170,000.00, without notifying the plaintiff of their
actions.
In 1966, without any knowledge whatsoever of this dis-
tribution, the plaintiff, pursuant to the 1959 agreement, ex-
ecuted an instrument transferring all of her interest in the
trust estate to Mr. Cooper, reciting therein that she had not
repaid any of her debt. In setting aside this absolute assign-
ment due to its "fraudulent procurement," the trial judge
stated:
I am completely satisfied that had Margaret Alderman known that
the trustees of the estate had made these distributions of money and
stock on her behalf she would have been able to arrange for the pay-
ment of her debt to Charles F. Cooper. [W]hen Margaret Alderman's
money and stock was given by the trustees to Charles F. Cooper, both
the Trustees and Charles F. Cooper owed a duty to Margaret Alder-
man to disclose these facts to her and to tell her what they were doing
with her money and stock and why they were doing it.51
The court said that these findings at trial, not challenged
on appeal, were conclusive and clearly imported such an ap-
propriation by Mr. Cooper of the plaintiff's property as to
50. 257 S.C. 304, 185 S.E.2d 809 (1971).
51. Id. at 310, 185 S.E2d at 811.
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amount to a conversion, giving the plaintiff a cause of action
against Mr. Cooper for its value.
As for the trustees, the court noted that there were two
rules generally applicable to these types of problems. The first
was that "[a] trustee must exercise reasonable care, prudence
and diligence in the management of his trust and is liable
to a beneficiary for loss occasioned by his negligence." 52 Sec-
ondly, "it is his duty to make payment or delivery of the trust
property to the person or persons entitled to receive it, and,
in general, his liability for loss occasioned by his failure to do
so is absolute."
5 3
The court held that here it was not necessary to discrim-
inate between the trustees' absolute liability and that based
on negligence. The circuit court had found that the trustees
had breached their duty to the plaintiff by making distribu-
tions without notifying her. This, the court held, was conclu-
sive that the trustees failed to exercise due diligence in the
management of the trust and therefore, they were liable per-
sonally to the plaintiff for any consequent loss.
V. TRUSTS BY OPERATION OF LAW
A. Constructive Trusts
An almost hopeless attempt by plaintiffs to establish a
constructive trust for a share of stock was illustrated in
Faulkner v. Faulkner.5
4
The Hilton Head Agricultural Company, a North Caro-
lina corporation, was organized in 1917 to acquire and man-
age land on Hilton Head Island as a hunting preserve. A few
years later, the testator bought one share of stock therein at
the going rate of $250.00.
52. Id. at 314, 185 S.E.2d at 813. The general rule here is that the trustees
should use such diligence as a prudent man would in relation to his own affairs.
Epworth Orphanage v. Long, 207 S.C. 384, 36 S.E2d 37 (1945) ; Cunningham
v. Cunningham, 81 S.C. 506, 62 S.E. 845 (1908).
53. Id. The rule here appears to be that when the terms of the trust are
clear, a trustee who exceeds his powers or departs from the trust will be liable
for any resulting loss notwithstanding the fact that he acted in good faith and
as a prudent man would have in relation to his own property. Rodgers v.
Herron, 226 S.C. 317, 855 S.E.2d 104 (1954); Crayton v. Fowler, 140 S.C.
517, 139 S.E. 161 (1925).
54. 257 S.C. 172, 184 S.E.2d 718 (1971).
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In 1954, the testator, being ill and unable to utilize the
club privileges, transferred his share of stock to the defen-
dant, his son, by written assignment, absolute on its face,
and defendant became a member of the club. At about the
same time, the testator made a rather general distribution
of most of his modest assets among his wife and children,
including his son.
In 1956 a bridge was constructed connecting the island
and mainland and land value on the island skyrocketed. At
the time of this suit, the share of stock was worth $100,000.
In 1958, the testator executed a new will in which he under-
took to devise the stock in question to the defendant "for
hunting purposes only" but should the land be sold the stock
would go to the plaintiffs and defendant in equal shares.
The plaintiffs, wife and two daughters of the testator,
seeking a declaration of a trust, alleged that the transfer of
stock to the defendant was in trust for all four of them and
that if the corporation should sell them its property or the
timber thereon the proceeds would be divided between the
four of them, share and share alike. The defendant simply
denied all of this and claimed ownership of the stock as the
transferee of his father.
Since the evidence was found by the referee and the trial
judge to be insufficient to create an express trust, the plain-
tiffs relied on the doctrine of constructive trust. Their theory
was that the purpose of the transfer was solely to make the
defendant eligible for membership in the club and they of-
fered evidence to show that the testator did not intend to part
with the beneficial ownership of the stock.
Reviewing the substance of the evidence the court stated
that since there was no ground for relief it was unnecessary
to determine its admissibility. It pointed out that much of this
evidence, equivocal at best, need not even be weighed because
as it went to establish the retention of beneficial ownership
by the testator, it necessarily opposed the theory of construc-
tive trust, which was the basis of the plaintiffs' case. Had
they claimed the stock under the 1958 will rather than on a
constructive trust, a consideration would have been necessary,.
the evidence bearing on the testator's intentions.
The court said that the written assignment, absolute on
its face, was presumed to be what the words imported, the
18
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transfer of title as well as beneficial ownership of the stock
to the defendant. The burden was on the plaintiffs to over-
come this presumption by clear and convincing testimony and
they simply failed to do so.
The court pointed out that the requirements necessary
to establish a constructive trust simply were not met. There
was no hint that the defendant induced the transfer by actual
or constructive fraud or any sort of wrongdoing, or that any
confidential relationship existed which would justify the in-
ference of undue influence.
The court gave its evaluation of the circumstances:
Mr. Faulkner (testator) apparently had come to fear, with reason,
that the pre-bridge gift to his son of a lightly regarded asset would
eventually unbalance the distribution of his estate. He regretted having
made the absolute assignment and undertook to undo it by his Will.
However, he could not bequeath what he no longer owned and, as
already stated, plaintiffs do not claim under the will. Nor was the will
admissible as evidence of his intention in making the earlier assign-
ment.5
B. Resulting Trusts
Ex Parte Stokes56 involved a resulting trust and estate
taxes. When Mr. G. B. Stokes died, his executor listed as assets
a one-half interest in two 30 acre tracts of land. The Tax
Commission found in the course of its investigation that the
record title to the land 'was in Mr. Stokes' name alone and
issued a deficiency for estate taxes in the amount of $4,396.89.
The executor asked for a redetermination of this estate
tax liability, contending that even though the title was in
the name of the deceased the actual owners were the deceased
and his wife as tenants in common due to the operation of a
resulting trust at the times of purchase.
55. Id. at 178, 184 S.E.2d at 721, citing All v. Prillaman, 200 S.C. 279,
291, 20 S.E.2d 741, 746 (1942) in which the relevant principle was stated:
We can conceive of no more dangerous doctrine in the law of
real estate than that a grantor in a deed can later . . . affirm in
his last will that the deed was invalid for lack of consideration
or other cause and proceed to devise the property to another
who should thereupon lay claim to it and offer as proof such a
will and its recitals.
56. 256 S.C. 260, 182 S.E.2d 306 (1971).
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The court pointed out that to prove the existence of the
resulting trust 57 the petitioner must show that Mrs. Stokes
paid a definite portion58 of the purchase money at the time"
of the transactions with the intention 0 of creating the trust.
The facts allowed just such a showing. The real estate
had been acquired by Mr. Stokes through three separate
transactions. In the first he had assumed a mortgage indebt-
edness of $710 as a portion of the consideration while Mrs.
Stokes had issued her personal check for the remainder of
$680. The consideration for the second parcel was $925.00
which was paid from joint funds of Mr. and Mrs. Stokes. Sim-
ilarly, the third parcel was obtained with funds from the
couple's joint real estate account.
The best argument the Commission had was that any
contribution Mrs. Stokes made was intended as a gift to her
husband and therefore no resulting trust existed, but the court
rejected this contention by distinguishing the authority on
which it was based.
In Legendre v. S. C. Tax Commission,61 the case heavily
relied on by the Commission, the court noted that the facts
were somewhat different. In that case, Mrs. Legendre had
purchased a plantation with money given to her by her father
and had had the title made to Mr. and Mrs. Legendre. When
Mr. Legendre died, the value of an undivided one-half interest
was included in his estate. Mrs. Legendre objected, contending
that her husband had held no interest beneficially but rather
on a resulting trust for her. That court passed over without
deciding the question of whether a presumption of a resulting
trust would arise in such a husband and wife situation and
based its finding of a gift on the fact that such was clearly
57. The general rule in these circumstances is that when real estate is
conveyed to one person and the consideration is paid by another, it is pre-
sumed that the person who paid the purchase money intended a benefit to him-
self, and accordingly a resulting trust is raised in his behalf. Legendre v.
S. C. Tax Comm'n, 215 S.C. 514, 56 S.E.2d 336 (1949); Hutto v. Hutto, 187
S.C. 36, 196 S.E. 369 (1938); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS §441,
comment e.
58. 256 S.C. at 263, 182 S.E.2d at 307. See Hutto v. Hutto, supra note 54.
59. Id., citing Green v. Green, 237 S.C. 424, 117 S.E.2d 583 (1960). See
Hodges v. Hodges, 243 S.C. 299, 133 S.E.2d 816 (1963).
60. Id. at 263-64 citing Surasky v. Weintraub, 90 S.C. 522, 73 S.C. 1029
(1911).
61. 215 S.C. 514, 56 S.E.2d 336 (1949).
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and unmistakably the intention of the parties as shown by
the facts.62
In the present case, holding that there was no evidence
showing any gift intention whatsoever, the court stated:
Everything connected with the purchase and ownership of the realty
definitely indicated that both parties considered the ownership as joint
or tenants in common. The evidence is positive that joint funds were
used to purchase the property, improve the property and build thereon.
Mrs. Stokes contributed her own monies toward the purchase at the
time of the purchase. The tax records indicate joint ownership for a
period of more than twenty years. Insurance policies also clearly show
joint ownership.
Petitioner has definitely established a resulting trust and has an
undivided interest in . . . (the) property.63
The Tax Commission was ordered to redetermine the
estate tax liability of the deceased, excluding one-half the
value of the lands in question.
HENRY DARGAN MCMASTER
62. Legendre, supra, at 518 quoting from 26 Am. JuR. Husband and Wife
§103 (1940):
There is a conflict of authority as to whether a trust or pre-
sumption of a trust in favor of a wife, or a gift or presumption
of a gift to her husband, exists where property is taken in his
name on a consideration from her. Unquestionably, if a payment
by a wife is made with the intention of making a gift to her
husband, no trust in her favor will arise.
The court pointed out that the underlying legal principle of Legendre,
supra, was embodied in RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw OF TRUSTS §441, comment e:
The fact that the payor takes title to property in the name of
himself and another jointly is an indication of an intention of
the payor to make a beneficial gift of an undivided interest in
the property to the other person; and in the absence of evidence
of a different intention of the payor, the other person does not
hold his interest upon a resulting trust for the payor. This is
true whether the transfer was made to the payor and the other
person, as joint tenants or as tenants in common.
63. 256 S.C. at 268-69, 182 S.E2d at 310.
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